Blankspot has obtained, through a trusted source, a Russian document titled “Programme for Work in the ‘Anti-Pashinyan’ Direction for 2026.”
The document outlines both overarching objectives and concrete methods for how the work is to be carried out.
Among other things, the document states that a central goal is to frame the election as a vote of confidence against Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan personally. It also describes efforts to limit the influence of the sitting Armenian government ahead of the parliamentary elections on 7 June. Another objective is to prevent Pashinyan’s “political image” from changing or being “modernized” before the vote.
However, the document does not specify which opposition party Russia prefers over Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party. Instead, it describes the tools that are to be used to influence public opinion.
Among the proposals is a plan to triple the presence of Russia-aligned narratives on social media compared to autumn 2025 — from one million views per day to as many as three million. According to the document, the number of opinion makers in the Russia-aligned network is to be expanded from 15 to around 40 individuals.
The document further states that the most prominent among them are to be placed in electable positions within opposition parties ahead of the election.
It also describes so-called “false flag” campaigns on social media, targeted comment campaigns against campaign workers from the ruling party, and the establishment of dedicated “stringer groups” to produce exclusive content during the election campaign.
Blankspot has been able to verify the authenticity and origin of the document, but it is not possible to determine to what extent the strategy has actually been implemented or how central it is to Russian influence efforts ahead of the election. Several aspects of the document do, however, correspond with recent developments in Armenia.
In the course of verifying the document, Blankspot established that it originated from materials obtained after a person operating within the Russian intelligence services was hacked by a third party before March 2026. His activities in Armenia mirror the contents of the document.
In Armenia, the man has participated in conferences and seminars, met opposition politicians, and frequently commented in the media on the country’s political development. The message has often been the same: that Armenia is heading down a dangerous path by turning away from Russia.
