"Since Lisbon, it was clear that not only the return of territories, but also the abolition of state institutions is a question." Commenting on this idea on the air of Public TV, Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said:
“If I'm not mistaken, I said something else about Lisbon. Let me pick up that chronology again and go into that last piece, which I've never touched on before, in detail now. In other words, I mentioned it in the Investigative Committee, but very vaguely.
Look what happened? In 1993, UN Security Council resolutions were adopted, where several protocols were made. According to the records, Nagorno-Karabakh was considered the territory of Azerbaijan by those resolutions. That is how it is written: Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan. Second, acquisitions made by force were considered illegal. The principle of inviolability of borders and territorial integrity of Azerbaijan was recorded. Let's put this aside. In 1994, the ceasefire comes and the negotiation process begins. In 1996, the OSCE Lisbon summit takes place. During this period, the concept of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue is based on the right to self-determination. What was the 1996 Lisbon summit about? The Lisbon summit of 1996, which is expressed by the chairman's statement, records the following: says: the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh should be resolved by exercising the right to self-determination, that is, Nagorno-Karabakh should receive autonomy within Azerbaijan. In other words, according to the results of the 1996 Lisbon Summit, the international community said what the right to self-determination means in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh.
I haven't had a chance to check whether it is now a public document or not. I assume that it is in the OSCE documents. After which, the Madrid principles of 2007 took place, summarizing if we say, the problems related to which I have previously raised.
Now, why do I say that the process of dissolution of the state order in Nagorno-Karabakh had already begun with the negotiation content we inherited in 2018? Why? Because I say that in the negotiation process in August 2016, and in the years, please pay attention, after the 4-day war in April 2016, in August, a third document appears in the negotiation content, which is about the following according to the record of our topic: the UN Security Council, in consultation with the UN Secretary General, Armenia, Azerbaijan and OSCE officials, will determine the ways in which Nagorno-Karabakh should organize its own life. And this will be the recognized status of Nagorno-Karabakh until the final status is decided.
What was the need for this document? And what was the need for this document to be created? The problem is that Azerbaijan and, in fact, the other co-chairs with Azerbaijan also recorded that Kazan's provision that Nagorno-Karabakh receives an intermediate status cannot be expressed by the perceptions of the Armenian side. What was the perception of the Armenian side in Kazan that Nagorno-Karabakh, which existed as of 2011, receives an intermediate status? In other words, the existing status of Nagorno-Karabakh is recorded as an intermediate status. What exists, the status quo of Nagorno-Karabakh, is recorded as an intermediate status. Azerbaijan rejects this, and in 2016, since the idea of an intermediate status exists in the Madrid principles, the third document in this package appears, which addresses the issue of the intermediate status of Nagorno-Karabakh.
What has changed here in the meantime? The following has changed: if Kazan's logic is that this situation in Nagorno-Karabakh is recorded as an intermediate status, in August 2016, it is recorded that we should go to the UN Security Council, discuss there how Nagorno-Karabakh should organize its life, and that will be the intermediate status. In other words, this implies that since everything will be decided by the UN Security Council from scratch, the status that Nagorno-Karabakh has will be nullified, and the UN Security Council will establish new ways, methods and mechanisms for how Nagorno-Karabakh will to organize life in consultation with Azerbaijan, Armenia, the co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group, the UN Secretary General and a number of subjects.
Now what is important here? Returning to the Madrid Principles, two major advantages of the Madrid Principles were cited by those bringing the Madrid Principles to the fore. First, the status of Nagorno-Karabakh will be determined in a referendum to be held within the terms agreed upon by the parties. This seems like a very good thing. But Azerbaijan used this provision, by the way, Azerbaijan needed this provision for that, to nullify the referendum of December 10, 1991 and the declaration and referendum of the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh, because if the status should happen in the future referendum, it means that this status was not recorded in the previous referendum.
Second, Azerbaijan needed and used the provision of intermediate status recorded by the Madrid principles. Look, it says, Nagorno-Karabakh gets an intermediate status. Azerbaijan used the referendum clause to reset the 1991 status quo. And it used the intermediate status to reset the status of Karabakh that day, taking it to the UN Security Council to start from scratch. And why should it be started from scratch, a question may arise, because it was recorded in the Madrid principles that Azerbaijanis have as many rights as Armenians have in all processes of Nagorno-Karabakh. If we are talking about the organization of life in Nagorno-Karabakh, then the organization of that life concerns not only Armenians, but also Azerbaijanis.”
