Washington will only continue to pressure Baku, although sanctions remain a last resort for the United States. Interview with with Richard Giragosian.
Is the prospect of Azerbaijan and Armenia reaching a conclusive Peace agreement possible through direct negotiation, without the involvement of intermediaries? What potential risks might this pose for Armenia? Furthermore, why does Azerbaijan reject Western mediation, and why does Washington opt for stern statements against Baku rather than pursuing sanctions? 1lurer.am's reporter Gayane Aprunts discussed these geopolitical dynamics with Richard Giragosian, Director of the Center for Regional Studies in Yerevan.
How would you comment on Baku's decision to decline the meeting between the foreign ministers, Ararat Mirzoyan and Jeyhun Bayramov, in Washington on November 20?
-Azerbaijan’s decision to reject the Washington meeting set for 20 November was a serious miscalculation and a strategic mistake, for two main reasons. First, the boycott of the meeting by Baku comes after earlier refusals to meet, in Brussels and Granada. This latest rejection raises frustration in the West, both in Brussels and in Washington. This Western frustration also means that there is much less tolerance for Azerbaijan’s maximalist position.
A second reason that Azerbaijan has miscalculated in angering Washington is that as difficult as the new post-war reality is for Armenia, Azerbaijan is also much less important to the U.S. than before. This decrease in Azerbaijan’s strategic significance for the U.S. is due to the American withdrawal from Afghanistan, which means that the powerful and influential Pentagon no longer needs Azerbaijani cooperation for the military “air corridor” into the Afghan theater.
Azerbaijan accuses the US of adopting a pro-Armenian stance and in your opinion, how supportive is Washington's position towards Armenia?
For the United States, Armenia stands out as a reliable partner and an increasingly important democracy. More broadly, Armenia is now seen and welcomed as a vibrant democracy, endowed with a rare commodity of legitimacy from two back-to-back genuinely free and fair elections. This only makes the Armenian government more attractive to the West, and especially to the United States. It also demonstrates that Armenia’s democratic credentials are now much stronger and more resilient than it may have appeared.
And for American policy in the region, the war of 2020 and the more recent Azerbaijani attack and military victory present two dangerous precedents. First, as a seeming validation of the use of force and, second, as a victory of authoritarian power over democracy. In the latter context, this was also a victory for a family-run, corrupt dictatorship.
US Assistant Secretary of State James O'Brien declared that, following the Azerbaijani actions on September 19, US-Azerbaijan relations cannot remain unchanged. High-level visits were canceled, actions were condemned, and a decision was made to withhold another waiver for Section 907. How far do you anticipate Washington going? Could it enforce tangible sanctions on Aliyev's administration?
It seems clear that the U.S. has little leverage over Azerbaijan, as Baku not only still holds support from Turkey but has also gained complicity and even cooperation from Russia. Yet Washington is now more serious about using the little leverage it does hold. And the already evident American frustration with Azerbaijan suggests that Washington will only continue to pressure Baku, although sanctions remain a last resort for the United States.
In an official statement, Washington emphasizes its neutrality on the venue for Armenian-Azerbaijani negotiations—be it Moscow, Brussels, or Washington. In your perspective, does US appear untroubled by the prospect of Russian mediation?
The American view correctly sees Russia as overwhelmed and distracted by its failed invasion of Ukraine. Obviously, Azerbaijan’s military victory over Nagorno-Karabakh dramatically altered the geopolitical landscape. But in terms of Russia’s failure to deter or stop Azerbaijan was no surprise. Rather, Russian weakness in the face of the Azerbaijani use of force has been matched by a steady erosion of Russia’s standing and the slow death of the “myth of Russian military might.”
More specifically, Azerbaijan has become quite good at challenging Russia. This has been most notable in the embarrassing humiliation of the Russian peacekeepers, the challenge to Russia’s power and position in the South Caucasus, and Azerbaijan’s open defiance of Russia. From that perspective, the nine-month siege of Nagorno-Karabakh by Azerbaijan was not just targeting the Armenians in Karabakh but was also a blatant disregard of the ceasefire that Russia was obligated to uphold since the end of the 2020 war. Against that backdrop, Russia is now in a position of weakness, not strength, and remains more insecure than self-confident.
For Armenia, this was not new either, as the past several years have been notable for the arrogant neglect of Armenia, and Nagorno-Karabakh, by Russia. In fact, the only consistency in Russian policy toward Armenia has been one of inattention, not intervention, of distraction, not determination.
Armenia and Azerbaijan have publicly disclosed that 70 percent of the peace agreement has been settled. Despite this progress, both parties continue to level accusations of impeding the signing process while concurrently bolstering their arsenals. In your perspective, does this unfolding scenario lean more towards the possibility of a breakout of war or the realization of a peace agreement?
Despite everything that has happened, there are expectations for a resumption of diplomatic negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan over a draft peace treaty. This expectation is based on the fact that the process has long been distinct and separate from Nagorno-Karabakh. And the peace treaty is a bilateral inter-state agreement that was also separate from the Karabakh conflict.
But there is a real risk of yet another escalation and round of military assaults by Azerbaijan against southern Armenia. This is largely due to the fact that Azerbaijan is emboldened and empowered by its recent military victory and remains encouraged by its perception of blind Turkish support, cunning Israeli backing and the lack of any Western leverage over Azerbaijan.
Against that backdrop, there is still no deterrence and little real incentive for Azerbaijan to stop now. Rather, there is a demonstrable danger that Azerbaijan will only continue to rely on military force, going beyond its conquest of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and moving against Armenia proper.
In your opinion, why does the USA endorse Armenia's stance on the so-called “Zangezur corridor”, despite opposition from Azerbaijan and Turkey?
The United States does not, and has never, supported the maximalist demand from Azerbaijan for a “corridor.” The U.S. does support the concept of “connectivity” and the restoration of trade and transport, however. And this is also driving EU and U.S. support for the Armenian position.
Do you believe it's feasible for Azerbaijan and Armenia to reach a final peace agreement through direct negotiations without international mediation, considering Azerbaijan's recent statement expressing readiness for bilateral talks?
The only realistic path forward for the negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan are through Western facilitation. Such external engagement is crucial because Azerbaijan continues to pressure Armenia, maintains a maximalist position and is confrontational in its position to reject diplomacy. No matter what the final bilateral Armenia-Azerbaijan “peace treaty” looks like, there are two major problems, however.
The first challenge is that there is no international guarantor of the peace treaty, which means that there is no real guarantee that Azerbaijan will implement the terms of the peace treaty or that Baku will stick to the terms of any such peace treaty. Just as there is nothing to deter Azerbaijan from using force against Armenia, there is also no pressure and no price for Azerbaijan if it fails to uphold the peace treaty.
The second obstacle is the “day after” the signing of any peace deal. There is little likelihood that Azerbaijan will stop or be satisfied with the treaty and instead will continue to demand more from Armenia. In that context, Azerbaijan remains the most significant threat to regional security and stability.
Interview by Gayane Aprunts
