The Clingendael Institute of International Relations of the Netherlands has published a report on ‘The EU in the South Caucasus’.
It is mentioned in the document that “The hostile relations and armed conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan are central to these regional dynamics, with Turkey trying to leverage its strong links with Azerbaijan to increase its presence in the region while also tentatively exploring a modest “normalization” of relations with Armenia. Russia is increasingly defaulting on its security commitments to Armenia and prioritizes good relations with Azerbaijan. Iran and Russia are also increasingly building a pragmatic security partnership based on common antagonism towards the West. The second set of dynamics is the long-standing competition between the West and Russia over influence in Georgia. While it would be amiss to see Georgia as becoming more ‘pro-Russian’, its government certainly appears to become less pro-Western.
In addition to these two long-standing but changing sets of rivalries, the South Caucasus is also importing geopolitical tensions from two other regions: the Middle East and South Asia. Israel is building relations with Azerbaijan to contain the regional influence of Iran, while tensions between Baku and Tehran are increasing. Iran and Armenia thereby also share an interest in countering Azerbaijan’s ambitions. Armenia, in its quest for alternatives to its dependence on Russian armaments, is increasingly reaching out to India while Azerbaijan maintains strong relations with India’s regional rival Pakistan. And finally, China – which has traditionally remained politically aloof from the South Caucasus – is increasingly interested in using the ‘Middle Corridor’ through Azerbaijan and Georgia to Europe to circumvent both the land route through Russia and the longer sea route. All these dynamics are difficult to encapsulate in a brief text and remain subject to further change, such as improved relations between Armenia and Turkey due to ‘earthquake diplomacy’. Therefore, the report also includes an interactive geopolitical mapping tool where the reader can further explore the different bilateral relationships.
If the EU is to assert itself as a ‘geopolitical actor’ in this complex neighbourhood, it must first clearly decide what its key interests actually are. This report identifies four parallel objectives that the EU pursues in the South Caucasus. There are 1) to export European values on good governance, democracy and human rights, 2) to promote stability and security, 3) to expand economic relations and secure energy and trade interests, and 4) to contain and even push back Russian influence. Problematically, we struggle to find an overall strategy in the EU’s application of these sometimes conflicting policy goals. The EU appears to be caught up in a reactive, short-term and ad-hoc modus operandi. To ensure that its investments of financial and political capital are successful, the EU should develop and implement a more holistic and strategic vision, both for the region and for its relations with the individual countries. In Georgia, the EU efforts to promote democratisation and European integration are facing obstacles. Georgian experts and politicians largely disagree with the EU’s decision to grant Georgia a lesser status than Ukraine or Moldova. However, the report finds that there was a good case for the EU’s July 2022 decision not to grant full candidate status, both for the credibility of the EU and to maintain pressure on the Georgian government to reform. Political polarisation in Georgia has become a major impediment for the country’s political functioning and EU integration. The EU – and Charles Michel personally – has been heavily involved but an EU-brokered deal broke down soon after it was agreed upon in 2021. For the time being it may be better for the EU to leave Georgian political actors to demonstrate their seriousness and their will to resolve the issue, as well as to move forward while building on the Commission’s requirements for acquiring EU candidate status.
The EU is close to brokering a comprehensive peace agreement, but still faces several sticking points. The first and most complex one concerns the future of Nagorno-Karabakh. While nominally excluding this issue from the bilateral peace treaty, the EU should nonetheless not close its eyes to the fate of the ethnic Armenians. The EU should press Baku to set up an internationally monitored arrangement that meaningfully guarantees the Armenians’ security and human rights. The second point is the establishment of a transport connection between Azerbaijan and its exclave Nakhchivan, which is greatly overdue but gives rise to security concerns in Armenia. It is therefore linked to the demarcation of the Armenian-Azerbaijani state border itself and particularly the withdrawal of Azerbaijani troops from sovereign Armenian territory. The EU should deter further Azerbaijani attempts to impose its will on Armenia by force. It is therefore crucial that the EU has eyes and ears on the ground, which makes the recent decision to deploy a civilian EU Mission in Armenia (EUMA) a highly significant move – if it has the mandate and resources it needs to accomplish its tasks.
Finally, the report finds that in the short term the EU has few possibilities to replace Russia as a security and economic actor in Armenia. Despite the Armenians’ deeply felt disillusionment with Russia, the Kremlin holds Armenia in a firm grip using its preponderance in the security, energy and media sectors. Russia’s always unequal partnership with Armenia is increasingly becoming a straitjacket. The EU should manage Armenian expectations about a ‘quick fix’ and in the meanwhile play the long game, using the CEPA framework to steadily reduce Armenian dependency on Russia. It should particularly strengthen Armenian democratic institutions to increase the country’s resilience to Russian interference.”
